Left: Mechanism of "Invest-and-Harvest". Attract new consumers with free offers and raise prices when they are locked-in due to switching costs. This mechanism is present in the diaper market, where consumers are inert and firms can distinguish between consumers that are new (babies) and mature (toddlers)
Middle: The paper shows high repeat purchase probabilities of 60-80% for the brand (increasing over the consumer life-cycle) and 30% for the no-name (stable). Over the consumer life-cycle, the prices for the brand increase much more than the prices of the no-name.
Right: Reduced-form evidence of the existence of dynamic ricing incentives. This graph shows that firms react in prices when there is a sudden event in the market, such as brand exit or consumer tests for diaper quality. When consumers learn that brand and no-name are of the same quality, then prices converge due to more switching of consumers that have been locked-in before.
Left: Higher cartel overcharges and longer cartel duration when upstream cartel uses RPM
Right: RPM (solid black) plotted against actual retail price (horizontal dashes) that decreases at high demand holidays (vertical lines)
Left: Post-merger price increases in regions where acquirer and target were active compared to regions where only one of the two operated
Right: Post-merger price declines in regions where acquirer or target was active compared to regions where none of the two operated
SSNIP market definition test at upstream level under two types of vertical contracts, IJIO 2020 [LINK]
Left: Assuming full pass-through from wholesale to retail price leads to large market definition when doing the SSNIP at upstream level
Right: Assuming incomplete pass-through from wholesale to retail price leads to smaller markets when doing the SSNIP at upstream level